Introduction
With rapid proliferation of content-rich multimedia devices such as smartphones and tablet PCs, wireless congestion has increasingly become a common problem in many urban areas. Users in the affected network would experience spotty services, dropped calls, and sluggish data speeds.
In the United States, the Federal Communication Committee (FCC) is responsible for allocating spectrum bands. In one of its recent studies (FCC Technical Paper 2010) , it predicted that the demand for wireless bandwidth would grow between 25 and 50 times the current levels within the (2008) reported that flight delays cost Management Science 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS passengers, airlines and the U.S. economy more than $40 billion every year. Current landing fees across the U.S. typically only depend on aircraft weight and do not vary with traffic. Given that the existing system is unlikely to promote an efficient use of the scarce runway space, it prompts for other mechanisms to alleviate the widespread problem of airport congestion across the country.
One common feature in the two examples mentioned above is oligopolistic competition with congestion effects. In the example of wireless communication, as of the fourth quarter in 2013, Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, Nextel, and T-Mobile together control nearly 93% of the U.S. market. While airports vary in sizes, a small number of airlines usually dominates an airport in terms of flight share. For both industries, Cournot model, also known as quantity competition, has received both theoretical and empirical support as a good modeling choice. Theoretically, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that Cournot models best approximate the long run results of two-stage competition with capacity choice followed by price setting: Airlines compete by first setting schedules and later set prices to fill seats; wireless service providers first purchase bandwidth and then determine prices for subscriptions. Empirical works, including Weisman (1990) , Zhang (1990, 1993) , Oum et al. (1993) , Parker and Roller (1997) and Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) , also support Cournot models reflecting actual competition in these two industries.
We would like to point out a subtle difference associated with congestion effects in the two examples: As wireless service providers use different frequency bands to reduce signal interference, congestion experienced with one carrier does not affect others. Congestion effect in this case is fully self-contained, i.e., the cost associated with one service provider only depends on his output level, such as the amount of bandwidth consumed. On the other hand, when one airline schedules an additional flight in a congested airport, it creates additional delays for every flight which is landing and taking off. Thus, for the airport example, besides self-contained cost, there also exists spillover cost, where an increase in one's output level also increases others' delay.
In this paper, we study both settings, depending on the presence of spillover cost. We evaluate the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly by comparing its welfare to the social optimum, which can be achieved through implementing congestion pricing. Our model consists of users, service providers and a facility manager: Users are sensitive to both prices and congestion; service providers compete for users with differentiated services by adjusting the output level; the facility manager imposes an admission level pricing scheme on service providers, with the goal to improve societal welfare.
Relating this model to the two examples, FCC could play the role of the facility manager and determines a unit price for bandwidth allocated to each wireless carrier, who in turn determines how many users to enroll. Similarly, FAA would be responsible for imposing a landing fee and each airline determines its flight frequency subsequently.
Contributions
Incentive alignment through congestion pricing We use an admission-level pricing scheme as a mechanism to coordinate the actions of profit-maximizing oligopolists with the goal to maximize social welfare. We show that when costs are fully self-contained, the facility manager must provide subsidies as service providers tend to underproduce compared to the social optimum. Moreover, the facility manager does not need to explicitly manage congestion as service providers have taken the effect into account when they optimize their output level. When spillover costs are present, service providers could still be entitled to subsides when their services offer more benefits to users relative to the congestion cost. The facility manager only needs to issue a penalty when the congestion cost which a service provider imposes onto others outweighs consumer surplus contributed by his services.
Efficiency analysis to quantify welfare loss We compare the total welfare in an unregulated oligopoly where service providers have free access to the facility to the social optimal welfare, so as to assess how much efficiency is lost due to the lack of coordination. We show that with selfcontained costs, the maximum efficiency loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25% of the optimal welfare, even in the presence of nonlinear costs. On the other hand, when spillover cost is present, there does not exist a constant lower bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly, even with affine cost. In particular, we show that when the marginal spillover cost associated with enrolling an additional user exceeds the increase in consumer surplus, the efficiency loss in an unregulated oligopoly could be significant.
Identification of key performance indicators and justification of coordination
In the absence of spillover cost, we show that efficiency of the unregulated oligopoly improves as competition among service providers increases. The result implies the limited role that coordination could play from a societal view point. With spillover cost, we show that the efficiency depends on the external cost-to-benefit ratio, which measures the severity of congestion by comparing the marginal spillover cost and the marginal consumer surplus. All things being equal, a higher external cost-to-benefit ratio indicates a larger welfare loss in the unregulated setting. It implies greater benefits that coordination could bring, thus, making congestion pricing more desirable.
Tight analytical bounds with novel proof techniques Our modeling choice is made in the context of service industries that compete with quantities and experience congestion. We present conditions and classes of cost functions for which the analytical bounds in the efficiency analysis are tight. We develop the analysis by utilizing tools such as Jacobian similarity, copositivity and spectral theorem from matrix analysis. We believe the methodology proposed in this work could potentially be used in other settings that incorporate asymmetric competition and nonlinear costs.
Related literature
Motivated by congestion management in transportation and communication networks, there has been a huge body of literature to analyze traffic in a congested network (e.g., Hamdouch et al. 2007 , Hayrapetyan et al. 2007 and Maille and Stier-Moses 2009 Allon and Federgruen 2007 , 2008 , Cachon and Harker 2002 , Johari et al. 2010 , where each firm is only sensitive to congestion caused by his users. A common method to describe users behavior in congestion models is by the Wardrop equilibrium (e.g., Johari et al. 2010, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007) , also known as single modal traffic equilibrium in the transportation literature (Wardrop 1952) . It implies that with identical or perfectly substitutable services, all users will choose the service provider who offers the lowest price. Our model differentiates itself from prior work by incorporating new features, such as asymmetric oligopolists with differentiated services.
We consider the general Wardrop equilibrium, an extension introduced by Dafermos (1982) , that describes a multimodal traffic network equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions imply that several prices could exist when service providers offer imperfect substitutes.
Besides the traditional network setting and applications with only self-contained costs, congestion pricing has also been proposed to address airport delays where spillover costs exist. Daniel (1995 Daniel ( , 2001 ) demonstrate the potential benefits of congestion pricing for an airport via a simulation model based on stochastic queuing theory. Brueckner (2002) argues that airport congestion pricing is different from road tolls as each road user is small relative to total traffic, in contrast to the observation that airlines have market power. The author shows, among other things, that airlines internalize some congestion cost based on a symmetric duopoly and generalizes the result to a network setting in Brueckner (2005) . In this work, we model congestion pricing as a "coordinating contract" between airlines and a facility manager, with the goal to quantify the benefits in terms of social welfare that such a scheme can offer.
As our work measures the performance of an unregulated setting with respect to a centralized system, it is closely related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy, popularized by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) . It compares the performance of the worst Nash outcome with respect to the centralized solution. The concept has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002 , Correa et al. 2004 , 2007 , Roughgarden 2005 , Perakis 2007 ), network pricing (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007, Johari et al. 2010) , single-tier oligopolistic pricing games Perakis 2010a,b, Kluberg and , and supply chain games (Perakis and Roels 2007 , Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009 , Perakis and Sun 2012 .
A common feature across Farahat and Perakis (2010a,b) , Kluberg and Perakis (2012) (which will be referred to as KP), Perakis and Sun (2012) and this paper is that part of analysis utilizes tools from matrix analysis to study an asymmetric game with multiple players. All prior work aforementioned (with the exception of KP) study Bertrand (also known as price competition) as opposed to Cournot competition. Unfortunately, the results and insights, as well as the proof techniques, generally do not transfer from the price to the quantity competition setting (see Farahat and Perakis 2011 for a discussion on how the two settings differ). Between KP and this work, there are several distinctions. In terms of the model, KP focuses on a single-tier oligopoly while our model also considers users who are both price and delay sensitive. Secondly, KP uses constant marginal cost while we consider nonlinear costs. In addition, we also consider the setting with spillover cost.
Thirdly, KP only focuses on the worst-case analysis with a lower bound on the performance, we also determine the best case with parametric bounds that indicate the key drivers in the unregulated oligopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model and assumptions used in the paper. Section 3 presents the efficiency analysis for the setting with fully selfcontained costs, while Section 4 focuses on the setting where spillover costs also exist. We evaluate the tightness of the bounds in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Problem Formulation
We consider a facility with n differentiated services, each offered by a provider. We denote q i as the output level chosen by service provider i = 1, . . . , n. Given an output level q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ), we denote the marginal utility derived from consumption as u(q) = (u 1 (q), . . . , u n (q)). One can interpret u i (q) as the additional utility of service i obtained by an infinitesimal user as when the facility maintains a service level q. As is traditional in the pricing literature (see Vives 1999), we consider the marginal utility function as a affine function of output level:
where p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) represents the maximum prices that a user is willing to pay for the services.
Different p i captures the quality differences perceived by consumers, which could be affected by factors such as brand recognition, word-of-mouth effects, prior experience with the product, etc.
Assumption 1. Matrix B is a symmetric and positive definite matrix. In addition, β ii > 0 for all i, β ij ≥ 0 for all j = i.
The assumption implies that ∂u i (q)/∂q i < 0, i.e., each service faces a downward sloping demand resulted from users' diminishing return from consumption. Meanwhile, ∂u i (q)/∂q j ≤ 0 suggests that service i and j are "strategic substitutes" (Bulow et al. 1985) . Symmetry of the matrix is a natural consequence of maximizing a quasilinear utility function of a representative consumer.
In a congested facility, both users and service providers are affected by congestion. For the case of airport congestion, airlines have to pay extra for crew, fuel, and maintenance costs while delayed travelers and their employers lose productivity, business opportunities and leisure activities. Let When service provider i enrolls q i users, total congestion cost associated with i and his users is
, the total congestion cost in the facility is given by q T l(q).
Assumption 2. For every i, the cost function l i (q) is convex, component-wise non-decreasing, and continuously differentiable with respect to q j , for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Denote the Jacobian matrix of l(q) as R =
, where r ij = ∂l i /∂q j . Except for affine cost functions, the Jacobian matrix R depends on the value of q. We will use superscripts to differentiate the matrix evaluated at different values of q.
Next, we formally define the two types of congestion cost studied in this work.
Definition 1. Self-contained cost, ∂l i /∂q i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Spillover cost, ∂l i /∂q j ≥ 0 for all j = i.
Denote the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix R as Γ R and R off respectively. We distinguish two settings, depending on the existence of spillover cost. When there is no spillover cost, the cost associated with service i only depends on i's output level. It implies that the Jacobian matrix on cost is simply a diagonal matrix, i.e., R = Γ R . In the setting with spillover costs, i.e., an increase in i's output level can induce to an increase in j's cost. The spillover cost is captured by R off .
Assumption 3. The maximum reservation price must satisfy,p − l(0) > 0.
The assumption states that the maximum profit per service must be positive. If this assumption is violated, it implies that no user is willing to pay for the service and this corresponding "inactive" service provider could be removed from the equilibrium.
For the analysis with spillover cost, we use the following assumption.
Assumption 4. The Jacobian matrix of the cost function l(q), R, is symmetric. Denote the Jacobian matrix of (l 1 (q), . . . , l n (q)) as H, where l i (q) = ∂l i /∂q i is positive quasi-definite (i.e.,
H + H T is positive definite).
Assumption 4 imposes restrictions on the Jacobian and Hessian matrix of the cost function l(q).
Note that when service providers have the same congestion cost per-service l i (q), the assumption is in fact not necessary. For example, consider a M/M/1 facility which is shared by the service providers, where the cost per unit time is c the maximum capacity is µ. The average delay cost in such a system is given by l i (q) = c/(µ − i q i ), for all i. Then one can show that both R and H are rank-1 positive semidefinite matrices which satisfy Assumption 4.
This assumption simplifies the derivation in the analysis with spillover cost as R = R T and the condition on the Hessian matrix ensures the uniqueness of the solution in the unregulated setting.
It is possible to relax it to some extent, but it involves more tedious derivations. As a result, we impose this assumption to enhance the transparency of the model.
Three-tier model
Our model consists of three key players: users, service providers and a facility manager. Users select service providers by taking into account of the price and congestion. Every service provider is a profit maximizer who competes with differentiated services by adjusting his output level. The facility manager imposes an access fee on service providers, with the goal to improve societal welfare. The three-stage problem is solved with backward induction. We now present the problem faced by each player and characterize the respective outocme.
2.1.1. User behavior A user's total disutility associated with using service i is the sum of the price he pays p i and the congestion cost he experiences l u i (q). The expression p i + l u i (q) is known as full price or effective price in the literature (Johari et al. 2010, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007) .
We assume that each user is "small" compared to the total traffic volume in the sense that when he switches from a service provider to another, there is no considerable change in the congestion cost. To model users' behavior of choosing differentiated services, we use a multimodal traffic network equilibrium analogy with elastic demands. The resulting equilibrium is also known as the general Wardrop equilibrium in the transportation literature (Beckmann et al. 1956 , Dafermos 1982 ): A vector of output level q is a general Wardrop equilibrium (GWE), if for every service provider i,
The equilibrium conditions state that for every active provider whose service level is positive, his full price must be equal to the marginal utility function obtained in the equilibrium. Remark 1. In a setting with a single type of service or symmetric service providers, u i (q) = u(q) for all i. GWE implies that a single full price prevails in an equilibrium. Intuitively, with perfectly substitutable services, when one provider charges a higher full price, all his users would switch to other providers. With differentiated services, different full prices could coexist in a market as service providers leverage product differentiation.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to these active service providers with q i > 0, whose fare prices follow
When there is no congestion, the market clearing price of an active service is simply its marginal utility function, i.e., p i = u i (q). The presence of congestion directly lowers users' willingness to pay and service providers' profitability.
Service provider's profit maximization problem Service provider
, where q −i are the service levels set by i's competitors and t i is the access fee per service imposed by the facility manager. Following Equation (1) which describes the users' behavior, we obtain the profit function
The dynamics between the facility manager and the service providers are modeled as a Stackelberg game. The facility manager announces the access fee per service, t, and the service providers then determine their appropriate output level, q(t). We assume service providers behave according to a subgame perfect equilibrium. That is, for a fixed access fee t i , service provider i determines his service level to maximize his profit, given the service level set by his competitors.
Facility manager's welfare maximization problem
The goal of the facility manager is to maximize the total social welfare (W ), obtained by aggregating consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (P S) and revenue collected from access fee (T R), i.e., W = CS + P S + T R.
Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the total utility derived from consuming q units of services and the total cost incurred by users. The total utility for an affine marginal utility function is given by q u(
Bq). The total cost is equivalent to the full price that users perceive, q T u(q). Thus, consumer surplus can be written as
Producer surplus is the total profit generated by all service providers,
Revenue collected from congestion pricing is captured by T R = q T t. Combining all three terms, the total welfare is given by the following,
Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the regulator's problem (3) is a strictly concave optimization problem with respect to the output level q, where q * = arg max q W (q). To achieve the maximum welfare W (q * ) in the three-level model, the facility manager can use the access fees so that the desirable service level q * is achieved, i.e., q(t * ) = q * . The access fee could be viewed as a "coordinating contract" that aligns the profit-maximizing objective of service providers to one that maximizes the societal welfare.
Proposition 1. The access fee per service i is given by
The access fee consists of two components of opposite signs -a subsidy that is aimed to correct underproduction and a penalty that targets overproduction by service providers who ignore the spillover cost imposed on others. In the setting without spillover cost, t i (q) = −β ii q i , implying that the facility manager has to provide appropriate subsidies to induce the socially optimal output level. In the setting with spillover cost, j =i r ji q j captures the marginal negative externalities i has imposed onto others. It is important to note that access fee does not manage self-contained cost since that service providers have already taken it into consideration when they determine their output level.
Proposition 1 provides a way of using access fee to achieve the optimal societal welfare. One natural question arises: What good does it do? Clearly any attempt to implement such a scheme on an industry-wide scale is certain to face institutional, political and financial challenges. An answer to the question could help policy makers gauge the need for regulation. In particular, if the benefit is proven to be substantial for some instances, it may provide some evidences to support its implementation. In the next subsection, we formulate this question mathematically and introduce some proxies used in the analysis as the key performance indicators.
Performance indicators
Efficiency analysis compares the social welfare achieved in an unregulated setting with the social optimum. It describes how efficient the unregulated setting is from the societal point of view. It also helps to pinpoint key factors that drive efficiency in the unregulated setting. This becomes particularly important when "optimum" might be infeasible to attain in certain applications.
In our context, service providers use the facility for free in the unregulated setting, i.e., t = 0. In a socially optimal setting, t * is implemented, such that the coordinated output level is maximizing total welfare, i.e., q(t * ) = q * . Denote q N and q * as the output level in the unregulated oligopoly and that in a social optimum respectively. Let W (q N ) and W (q * ) be the corresponding total welfare attained in these two settings. The quantity of interest for efficiency analysis is
With nonlinear costs, it is generally hard to obtain closed-form solutions in the two settings.
Nonetheless, one can derive optimality conditions that can help quantify the total welfare, as shown in Proposition 2. Since the Jacobian matrix of the cost function depends on the output level, we will use R * and R N to distinguish the matrix evaluated at q * and q N respectively.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, there exists unique solutions in the social optimal and the unregulated settings. They are given by the following,
The main focus of this work is on quantifying the efficiency of service industries for two settings depending on the presence of spillover cost. For each setting, we establish a lower bound on
which gives the worst performance guarantee, as well as an upper bound which sheds some insights on how to improve the performance.
To establish these bounds, one of the machineries from matrix analysis that we utilize is the concept of Jacobian similarity property.
Definition 2. The Jacobian similarity property. A positive semidefinite matrix F(q) satisfies the property if there exists a constant κ ≥ 1 such that for all w, q and q :
If F(q) is the Jacobian matrix of an affine function such that F(q) is independent of q, the only κ that satisfies the condition is 1. When matrix F(q) is positive definite for all q, it is easy to derive a loose bound on this constant based on its definition: κ = max q
, which is the maximum conditional number of the Jacobian matrix. We refer the reader to Perakis (2007) for more information on this concept. Later in the paper, we will show that it is possible to obtain bounds on κ without searching through the entire space of q and how this term is related to nonlinearity of the cost structure.
To interpret the bounds in efficiency analysis, we will introduce the following two parameters, which measure the intensity of competition among service providers and the severity of spillover costs respectively.
Definition 3. Competition index adjusted with self-contained cost Given a price sensitivity matrix B and self-contained cost Γ R , the competition index for service provider i is defined
The notion that j =i β ij /β ii is used to measure the intensity of competition can be found in Sun (2006), Farahat and Perakis (2010a,b) . Suppose every service provider in the market changes his output level by 1 unit, β ii reflects the amount of price change which is solely contributed by i's own output change, while j =i β ij measures the price change contributed by i's competitors. A high value of j =i β ij /β ii suggests that i's price is more susceptible to his competitors' output change than his own change, implying that service provider i faces a high level of competition.
When j =i β ij = 0 for all i, it implies that β ij = 0 for all j = i. That is, each of service provider acts as a monopolist and does not face any competition.
When there is self-contained cost (i.e., r ii > 0), the competition index also contains the term r ii /β ii . It compares the marginal decrease in the revenue per service due to one's self-contained cost increase to the decrease due to diminishing returns of the demand. Thus, when r ii /β ii is large, it implies that the cost increase is rather steep.
Thus, γ i meausres the level of competition faced by service provider i, taking into account the self-contained cost, i.e., comparing the aggregate price impact from i's competitors and the selfcontained congestion to the price change solely contributed by i's output change. With asymmetric service providers, γ i differs across i. With nonlinear cost, γ i also depends on the output level q.
We will useγ = max i γ i | q=q * to approximate the competition intensity under the optimum output level.
Definition 4. External cost-to-benefit ratio Given a price sensitivity matrix B and con-
This quantity is nonzero only when spillover cost is present. The numerator j =i r ji captures the marginal spillover cost created by service provider i, and the denominator reflects the additional consumer surplus when service provider i increases his output. Thus, the term ρ i could be interpreted as the external cost (spillover congestion cost) versus the external benefit (additional consumer surplus) which service provider i brings to the society.ρ indicates the maximum net externality in an oligopoly: Whenρ ≤ 1, every service provider is contributing more welfare to the society than the spillover cost, thus, the net externality remains positive; on the other hand, when ρ > 1, there exists some service provider whose spillover cost outweighs the external benefit which he brings to the society, implying negative net externality.
With nonlinear costs, the external cost-to-benefit ratio depend on q. Similar to the competition index, this parameter is evaluated at the social optimum. Note that as the welfare maximization problem is a strictly concave optimization problem, q * can be easily computed. We will begin the analysis for the setting without spillover cost in Section 3. The setting with spillover cost will be examined in Section 4 .
Efficiency Analysis in the Absence of Spillover Cost
Motivated by modern technology-based (e.g., telecommunication, computing) service providers whose costs are fully self-contained, in this section, we focus on the setting when there is no spillover cost. The first result compares the output level in the unregulated setting to the optimum.
Proposition 3. In the absence of spillover cost,
The proposition states that the output level in the unregulated setting is always below the socially optimum. This result seemingly contradicts the observation on wireless congestion discussed in the beginning of the paper. One plausible argument is that Proposition 3 refers to the outcome of a market that is operating in a static equilibrium, whereas the booming sales of smartphones and tablets imply a market that is far from being in a steady state. Nevertheless, later in this section, we will discuss how efficiency analysis reveals the service providers' attitude towards self-contained costs and draws connections with recent developments in the wireless communication industry.
Efficiency analysis
We are going to present our first key result which quantifies the efficiency analysis of the unregulated oligopoly with a constant lower bound and a parametric upper bound. The proof for the bounds is shown in Subsection 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Theorem 1. In the absence of spillover cost, under Assumptions 1 to 3, total social welfare in an unregulated oligopoly with nonlinear convex costs is bounded between
where κ is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is tight when service providers are noncompeting and the cost l(q) is independent of q. The upper bound is tight when service providers are symmetric and l(q) is either independent of q, or an affine function of q (i.e., κ = 1 for both cases).
Theorem 1 states that when costs are fully self-contained, the unregulated setting achieves at least 75% of the optimal societal welfare. The worst case for efficiency loss occurs when l(q) is independent of q (κ = 1) and the service providers are not competing (γ = 0). Notice that for this particular case, the upper bound and the lower bound in Theorem 1 coincide. as the intensity of competition in the facility increases. When the service providers are independent with monopolistic power, i.e.,γ = 0, the efficiency loss is at its maximum of 25%. As the competition among the service providers intensifies, the efficiency gap between the unregulated setting and the social optimum diminishes. For example, whenγ = 1, the gap is 11.1%; asγ increases to 2, the gap reduces to 6.25%. It implies that in industries with a fair amount of competition, the unregulated setting could be quite efficient.
To explain this behavior, recall that in Proposition 3, we have shown that incentive misalignment leads to underproduction in the unregulated setting. For a given cost structure, Theorem 1 shows that the extent of misalignment in incentive is directly related to the market power of service providers. When service providers have monopolistic power (i.e., no competition), the output level is at its lowest level with respect to the optimum, resulting in the lowest efficiency. As competition increases, it reduces the market power of individual service providers, and subsequently shrinks the efficiency gap. Take perfect competition as an extreme example, whereγ → ∞, the upper bound in Theorem 1 shows that W (q N ) → W (q * ). That is, total welfare obtained under an unregulated oligopoly converges to that of an fully coordinated setting.
The constant lower bound in Theorem 1 might be surprising at first, especially compared to other works on congestible games. For example, Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) and Roughgarden (2005) study the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. In their setting, the authors show that performance degrades with nonlinearity of the latency functions. In contrast, we have
shown that the performance degradation caused by noncooperative service providers is bounded, even with highly nonlinear costs. This is because when the costs are fully self-contained, the service providers have fully taken the cost impact into consideration while determining the equilibrium output. Although our setting restricts to a competing market in an equilibrium state, there are welldocumented evidences suggesting that service providers take full responsibility of self-contained cost. A recent study (Research and Markets 2013) states that the four largest carriers in the U.S.
are going to to spend $10 billion on infrastructure in 2013 as they are competing to roll out newer and faster network to meet users' rising demand for wireless connection. The study forecasts that the total expenditure on network infrastructure in the U.S. will reach $37.5 billion by 2017.
We would like to point out that in order to compute the upper bound in Theorem 1, it also requires the knowledge of the Jacobian similarity factor κ . In the proof of the upper bound (in Section 3.3), we have given a precise definition on κ (see Equation 8 ). However, despite its tightness, the definition has a rather complex form and does not offer much insights. We simplify its expression by giving it an upper bound as shown below.
Proposition 4. Without spillover cost, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ ≤
, where l i (·) = ∂l i /∂q i .
• For monomial cost,
, where c i is the constant cost coefficient and k is the degree of nonlinearity, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ ≤ 2 2(k−1) .
• For the M/M/1 model with delay cost,
, where c i is congestion cost per unit time, µ i is i's service rate and q i is the user arrival rate, then κ ≤ max i
The Jacobian similarity factor κ is bounded by the maximum ratio of the marginal cost obtained in the optimal and the unregulated settings. Clearly, when l(q) is affine in q, since its marginal cost is the same in the two settings, Proposition 4 shows that κ = 1. We have also presented an upper bound for two families of cost functions, namely, the monomial and the M/M/1 delay costs.
To do so, we need to have a lower bound on q N and we have used q N ≥ 1/2q * from Proposition 3.
In general, one can obtain a better bound on κ by providing a tighter lower bound for q N .
Theorem 1 offers us some comfort in knowing that when costs are fully self-contained, the worst efficiency loss is bounded and the actual number could be considerably smaller in reality when competition exists. In the following two subsections, we will present the proof for Theorem 1. We begin with the analysis for the constant lower bound, and follow by the parametric upper bound.
Proof of Theorem 1 for the lower bound
The proof heavily utilizes some tools from matrix analysis. This allows us to analyze multiple asymmetric players and nonlinear cost. To enhance clarity, a proof outline is given as below. It consists of three key steps.
Step 1: We make use of the convexity of the cost function (Lemma 4 in the Appendix) and the optimality conditions in Proposition 2 to derive an upper bound on W (q * ) in terms of q N .
Step 2: We simplify the lower bound for W (q N )/W (q * ) to a composite matrix using eigendecomposition and properties of similar matrices.
Step 3: We establish a constant lower bound on W (q N )/W (q * ) by showing the composite matrix is copositive 1 . We establish copositivity by showing that the composite matrix is the product of two nonnegative matrices. Thus, it is also a nonnegative matrix which is copositive by definition.
Step 1: This step is labeled as Lemma 1, which also holds with spillover costs.
Lemma 1. The optimal societal welfare is bounded from above by the following,
Proof of Lemma 1. By Proposition 2,
where we reach the inequality by replacing Σq * by Ωq N . Expand this expression further,
By the definition of the eigenvalue, this expression is upper bounded by the maximum eigenvalue of composite matrix ∆ as follows,
Now let us focus on this composite matrix ∆. By the property of similar matrices, λ max {∆} =
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, λ max {∆} ≥ 0 since ∆ is positive semidefinite. Expand this matrix,
It is clear that λ min {((B + R
because it is also a positive semidefinite matrix. Thus, λ max {∆} ≤ 1. From Equation (4), we can conclude that W (q
Step 2: With Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, W (q N )/W (q * ) can be lower bounded as follows:
In the absence of spillover, R N = Γ N R . Since all quantities are the Nash equilibrium quantities in this proof, we drop the superscript on matrices for ease of notation:
. This is a symmetric, nonnegative positive definite matrix. We will first rewrite the right hand side of the inequality above in terms of matrix G and identity matrix I:
Step 3: To show this ratio has a constant lower bound of 3/4, it implies that
To establish this statement, we will show that the composite matrix in Equation (6) is in fact copositive. We express it as follows,
Given matrix G is a nonnegative matrix, the second term which is a sum with an identity matrix is clearly nonnegative. Now consider the first term, G − I. The off-diagonal elements β ij /( β ii β ij ) are nonnegative under Assumption 2, where β ij is the (i, j) th element of matrix B. Its diagonal elements are given by (β ii + 2r ii )/β ii = 1 + 2r ii /β ii ≥ 1, where r ii is the i th diagonal element of the Jacobian matrix R. Therefore, G − I must also be nonnegative. We have shown that the composite matrix in Equation (6) could be expressed as the product of two nonnegative matrices. Therefore, this composite matrix must also be nonnegative, and therefore, copositive.
Lastly, to show that the bound is tight, note that with noncompeting service providers, B = Γ B .
Moreover, when l(q) is independent of q, its Jacobian matrix R is 0. Using the equilibrium and optimality conditions shown in the proof for Lemma 2, it is easy to show that the service level in the unregulated setting is exactly half of the optimal level, i.e., q N = 1 2 q * . Substituting this condition into the welfare objective function in Equation (3), it shows that the ratio is exactly 3/4.
Proof of Theorem 1 for the upper bound
Instead of a constant bound as shown in the previous section, the upper bound on the efficiency is a parametric function of the competition index,γ, evaluated at the optimal output level q * .
There are three key steps in the proof, which are outlined as follows. The first two steps (denoted as Lemmas 2 and 3) continue to hold with spillover costs.
Step 1: We make use of Proposition 2 and the convexity of the cost (Lemma 4) to provide an upper bound on W (q N ). Next, we express W (q N ) in terms of the optimal output level q * by using the Jacobian similarity property.
Step 2: We simplify the upper bound of W (q N )/W (q * ) to a composite matrix using eigendecomposition and the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem.
Step 3: We characterize an upper bound on W (q N )/W (q * ) in terms of the maximum eigenvalue of a composite matrix. We show that the bound can be simplified by replacing the eigenvalue with the competition index through Gergsgorin Disc Theorem which bounds the spectrum of any square matrix.
Step 1:
Lemma 2. The welfare in the unregulated setting is bounded from above by the following,
where κ ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor.
Proof of Lemma 2. From Proposition 2, we obtain that
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Making use of Lemma 4 which shows that Ψq
follows that
where we obtain the last inequality by using the Jacobian similarity property and κ is defined as the maximum eigenvalue of a positive definite matrix,
Note that a more intuitive (but less tight) upper bound for κ is given in Proposition 4.
Step 2:
Lemma 3. 
As all quantities are in the social optimum setting, we will skip the superscript on matrices. Denote
, the expression becomes
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the upper bound can be simplified as the follows.
Step 3: In the absence of spillover cost, R off = 0 or Ξ = 0, and the upper bound in Lemma 3 can be simplified into
is a symmetric, positive definite matrix. By the property of similar matrices, this matrix is similar to Γ −1 B (B + 2Γ R ). Thus, they share the same set of eigenvalues. Using the Gershgorin Disc Theorem, we can upper bound the maximum eigenvalue of a matrix, i.e.,
Substituting these two inequalities into Equation (9), we obtain the desired bound.
In order to show the tightness result, note that when the costs is affine, κ = 1. The inequalities in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 become equalities. Moreover, with symmetric service providers, γ i =γ, for all i, one can show that the maximum eigenvalue of matrix G is exactly equal to 1 +γ.
Efficiency Analysis in the Presence of Spillover Cost
In the previous section, we have seen that in the absence of spillover cost, the efficiency loss of an unregulated setting is always bounded by 25% of the optimum welfare, irrespective of the nonlinearity of cost functions. In this section, we present the efficiency analysis with spillover costs.
This analysis reveals that the efficiency depends heavily onρ (the maximum external cost-to-benefit ratio evaluated at the social optimal output level) and the loss in efficiency could be much more severe for this setting.
Theorem 2. With spillover congestion cost, under Assumptions 1 through 4, the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly depends onρ.
(a) Whenρ ≤ 1,
where κ ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is tight when service providers are noncompeting and the cost l(q) is independent of q. The upper bound is tight when service providers are symmetric and l(q) is either independent of q, or an affine function of q.
where κ ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is asymptotically tight when the cost l(q) is an affine function of q andγ → 0. The upper bound is tight with symmetric service providers and the cost-to-benefit ratioρ=1. Remark 2. When there is no spillover cost, i.e.,ρ = 0, Theorem 2(a) coincides with Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 states that the maximum benefit-to-cost ratioρ has a critical value at 1 as it has an opposite impact on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly depending on whetherρ ≥ 1. To illustrate this effect, Figure 2 depicts W (q N )/W (q * ) againstρ for noncompeting service providers with affine cost κ = κ = 1. We setγ to 0 so as to isolate the impact of competition and selfcontained cost fromρ. Note that in this case, the upper bound in Theorem 2(a) and the lower bound in Theorem 2(b) coincide. As shown in Figure 2 , efficiency increases withρ whenρ ≤ 1 and decreases afterρ exceeds 1. It is important to take note that even with affine cost, efficiency loss can be significant with largeρ.
To gain some intuitions, when an additional user is enrolled, two types of externalities are imposed to the society. The positive externality comes from additional consumer surplus through acquiring the service, whereas the negative externality is due to the existence of spillover cost. By definition,ρ is the ratio between the marginal spillover cost to the marginal consumer surplus. When ρ ≤ 1, the marginal consumer surplus outweighs the marginal spillover cost, implying enrolling an additional user leads to a net positive welfare to the society. As a result, the efficiency of an regulated oligopoly improves with this quantity. Whenρ reaches the critical value of 1, the marginal spillover is completely offset by consumer surplus and W (q N ) = W (q * ). Whenρ > 1, with every additional enrollment, the increase in spillover cost outweighs the welfare gain, resulting in a net negative welfare change. Therefore, asρ continues to increase, the gap between the unregulated setting and the social optimum widens.
We can also useρ to draw a connection to the optimal access fee and the output level in the unregulated oligopoly. We have seen in Proposition 1 that when β ii q i > j =i r ji q j or j =i r ji q j /(β ii q i ) ≤ 1, the access fee is a subsidy which aims to promote higher output level. One can show that with asymmetric service providers,ρ ≤ 1 indicates that q N ≤ q * . On the other hand, when β ii q i < j =i r ji q j , the access fee is a penalty to reduce the output level, implying the existence of congestion in the unregulated oligopoly. This helps to explain the similarity in the efficiency result with only self-contained costs (Theorem 1) and the setting with spillover costs withρ ≤ 1 (Theorem 2a).
In both cases, the unregulated oligopoly is underproducing compared to their optimal counterpart.
Competition among service providers reduces the oligopolistic power and consequently promotes its efficiency.
With nonlinear spillover costs, we have two Jacobian similarity factors, i.e., κ in the upper bound forρ ≤ 1 and κ in the lower bound forρ ≥ 1. Their precise definitions are given in Equations (8) and (18) respectively. The following result provides a more intuitive upper bound which shows their dependence on the cost structure.
Proposition 5. (a) With spillover costs, the Jacobian similarity factors are bounded by κ ≤
When service providers are symmetric with u i (q) =p − β i q i − j β j q j and r ij = r for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, these bounds
(b) Denoteq =p 2β i +(n−1)β j as the output level in the unregulated oligopoly without congestion cost.
• For monomial costs, l i (q) = c( j q j ) k , where c > 0 is the constant cost coefficient and k is the degree of nonlinearity, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ ≤ 2 2(k−1) and κ ≤ (* ) k−1 ;
• For the M/M/1 model with delay cost, l i (q) = The method to find an upper bound for κ without knowing q N is very similar to the setting with only self-contained cost. We use a lower bound q N ≥ 1/2q * becauseρ ≤ 1 indicates that q N ≤ q * .
To determine κ , as q N ≥ q * , we need to provide an upper bound on q N , which is denoted asq.
One such lower bound, which we have used in Proposition 5 is to letq be the output level in the absence of congestion costs.
In the proof of Theorem 2, we express the Jacobian matrix R as Γ R and R off (representing the self-contained and the spillover costs) and show that some steps for Theorem 1 continue to hold.
As the main techniques are similar to what is shown in Section 3.2 and 3.3, we relegate the proof of Theorem 2 to the Appendix.
Simulation Experiments
So far, we have developed several bounds to evaluate the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly.
We show that the bounds are tight for special cases, such as noncompeting service providers or symmetric service providers with affine costs . This section addresses a natural follow-up question:
How "good" are our bounds for more general cases?
Management Science 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Two factors affect the tightness of our bounds, namely, nonlinearity of the cost functions and asymmetry among service providers. In order to pinpoint the individual impact on the bound performance, we first focus on symmetric service providers and evaluate the impact of cost nonlinearity in Section 5.1. Next, in Section 5.2, we focus on studying the impact of asymmetry among service providers when the costs are affine functions. Since the performance on the parametric bounds is similar across different settings, we will illustrate the upper bound result from Theorem 1 in Sections 5.1 and that from Theorem 2 in Section 5.2.
Effect of nonlinearity
We conduct two experiments with different nonlinear cost functions for symmetric service providers to evaluate the impact of nonlinearity of the costs on the tightness of the bounds. In both experiments, for the marginal utility function p i (q) =p i − β ii q i + j =i β ij q j , we letp i = 20, β ii = 10 for all i. We allow β ij to take values from [0, 1, 3, 5] for all j = i. Increasing the β ij s while keeping the β ii s fixed implies that the intensity of competition is increasing. Note that β ij = 0 represents noncompeting service providers.
In the first experiment, we consider a monomial cost function, i.e., l i (q i ) = c i q k i , where c i = 1 is the constant cost coefficient and the power k denotes the degree of nonlinearity. Figure 3a shows the actual efficiency ratio W (q N )/W (q * ) for a setting with n = 5 service providers and the upper bound developed in Theorem 1 against the nonlinearity factor k, depicted by the solid and dashed lines respectively.
(a) Monomial cost (b) M/M/1 system cost Figure 3 Simulation experiments illustrate the performance of the bound with respect to nonlinearity. The solid and dashed lines represent the actual efficiency ratio and the bound respectively.
In the second experiment, we consider the cost function from a standard M/M/1 system,
, where c i = 1 denotes the congestion cost per unit time and µ i denotes i's service rate and µ i = 10 for all i. Besides increasing β ij s as we have done in the first experiment, we also vary the number of service providers from 1 to 20. The exact efficiency ratio and the upper bound are shown in Figure 3b .
In both experiments, we observe that the worst case for the efficiency loss occurs with noncompeting service providers. The exact efficiency ratio W (q N )/W (q * ) improves as competition increases, either by increasing the β ij s or increasing the number of service providers (except the case of noncompeting service providers). We also observe from Figure 3b that efficiency increases from having an additional service provider is more pronounced when there is a fair amount of competition in the existing market. For example, with β ij = 5, when the market expands from a monopoly (n = 1) to a duopoly (n = 2), the increase in
The impact of varying the degree of nonlinearity k in the first experiment is less conclusive. As we see in Figure 3a , efficiency first decreases then increases with k. However, with competing service providers, the general trend seems to suggest that the effect of cost nonlinearity on efficiency is limited as the variations in W (q N )/W (q * ) across k are rather small.
The bounds in both experiments appear to follow the exact ratio quite closely. The error between the bound and the exact ratio is at its largest with noncompeting service providers. With competing service providers, the bound becomes considerably tighter as competition intensity increases. Figure   3a shows that with competing service providers, when k ≥ 5, the bound matches the exact ratio for β ij ≥ 3. In Figure 3b , with noncompeting service providers, the error between the bound and the exact efficiency ratio is about 4%. When β ij ≥ 3, the differences are reduced to less than 1%.
Effect of asymmetry
In this section, we focus on a setting with asymmetric service providers and affine spillover costs so as to evaluate the performance of the upper bound in Theorem 2 (whenρ ≤ 1). Figure 4 reports the result of a simulation experiment with 500, 000 instances. For each instance, a number corresponding to the number of service providers is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval [2, 25] . Next, we generate a random positive vectorp, a positive definite matrix with nonnegative elements B and a positive semi-definite matrix R of the corresponding dimension to represent the asymmetric service providers (R is independent of q since costs are affine).
We first solve the problem in the unregulated and the optimal settings respectively and compute the exact value for W (q N )/W (q * ). Next, we determine the corresponding upper bound in terms ofγ andρ. We summarize the differences between the exact quantity and the lower bound in the histogram as shown in Figure 4 . The experiment suggests that the upper bound provides a fairly accurate estimate of the exact quantity. For most of the 500,000 instances, the differences between the two quantities are within 0.05. The y-axis represents the relative frequency of the instances within the bin size.
Conclusions
In this work, we have considered a setting where several services providers compete for users who are sensitive to both prices and congestion by providing multiple differentiated services. We have
shown that in the absence of spillover cost, the unregulated setting could be quite efficient and the maximum welfare loss is capped at 25%, even with highly nonlinear convex costs. Competition among service providers promotes efficiency of the unregulated setting. With spillover cost, the efficiency of the unregulated setting highly depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal spillover cost and the marginal consumer surplus associated with enrolling an additional user.
When the marginal benefit outweighs the marginal spillover cost, enrolling more users improves the efficiency of the unregulated setting. On the other hand, when the marginal spillover cost exceeds the marginal benefit, the loss of efficiency can be potentially severe as it increases with the marginal spillover costs.
Substitute Equation (13) into the welfare objective (Equation 3), we obtain the following:
In the unregulated setting, there is no access fee, i.e., t = 0. To show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, under Assumptions 1 to 3, the strategy space for each service provider is compact and convex.
The payoff function is continuous and concave with respect to his own strategy. Therefore, the existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed (Debreu 1952) . To show uniqueness, the Hessian matrix of the payoff function can be expressed as −(B + Γ B + R + Hdiag(q)), where H is the Jacobian matrix for (l i (q), . . . , l n (q)) with l i = ∂l i /∂q i , and diag(q) is a nonnegative matrix with q on its diagonal. Thus, under Assumption 1, 2 and 4 (note that Assumption 4 is only needed for the spillover cost case), the uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the fact that the Hessian matrix is negative quasi-definite (Rosen 1965) .
The equilibrium condition for all service providers in Equation (2) can be written in the matrix form:
where Γ B and Γ R represent the diagonal matrix of B and R respectively. Since q N satisfies the equilibrium condition, we obtain
Substituting Equation (15) into the welfare objective gives the welfare achieved in the unregulated setting,
C. Proof of Proposition 3
When costs are fully self-contained, R = Γ R . Comparing the optimality condition (Equation 12 ) and the equilibrium condition for the unregulated setting (Equation 14) , it is easy to see q N ≤ q * as service providers take all the costs into account.
To show the lower bound on q N , consider a special case with a monopolist whose cost is independent of output level, i.e., B = β, l(q) = l, and R = 0. Then, the unregulated problem is reduced to a one-player concave optimization problem. It is straightforward to show that q N = 1 2 (p − l)/β while the optimum is q * = (p − l)/β. We will show that q N /q * = 1/2 is the worst case for all convex costs in the proof for Theorem 1 when we prove the bounds on efficiency analysis.
D. Lemma 4 and its proof
Lemma 4. When each component of the cost fuction l(q) = (l 1 (q), · · · , l n (q)) is a convex function with respect to vector q,
Remark 3. When the cost function l(q) is an affine function of q, then Jacobian matrix R is independent from the output level q. The inequalities in Lemma 4 become equalities.
Proof. To show Lemma 4(a), by convexity on the cost function l(q) = (l 1 (q), · · · , l n (q)),
Adding a positive vectorp to both sides maintains the inequality, i.e,
After substituting the optimality conditions derived in Equation (12) and (14), we obtain
To establish Lemma 4(b), with a similar argument,
We obtain the desired result by substituting the optimality conditions in Equation (12) and (14).
E. Proof for Proposition 4
Without spillover cost, replace R with Γ R in the definition for κ shown in Equation (8), we obtain
κ is upper bounded by the maximum eigenvalue of a composite matrix, which is further bounded by the product of two maximum eigenvalues.
Since we have shown that q N ≤ q * in Proposition 3, by monotonicity of cost functions, we obtain
As the result, the second maximum eigenvalue in Equation (16) must be less than 1. Thus,
is positive definite and we know that the first maximum eigenvalue in Equation (16) is greater than 1, we can further bound the eigenvalue by κ ≤
Since costs are monotone, if we can lower bound q N with a quantityq, we then have a lower bound on
. From Proposition 3, we setq = q * /2 and obtain the desired result.
With a monomial cost, the marginal cost is given by l i (q i ) = c i kq
, where k is the degree of nonlinearity. With affine cost where the nonlinearity degree k = 1, the Jacobian similarity factor κ = 2 0 = 1.
With congestion cost from a M/M/1 system, the marginal cost is given by l i (q i ) = c i (µ i −q i ) 2 . Thus, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ ≤ max i
. In general, one can find a tighter bound on the Jacobian similarity factor κ by providing a tighter lower bound on q N .
F. Proof for the lower bound in Theorem 2
The analysis with spillover costs depends on the matrix
It is a symmetric matrix and is similar to Γ −1 B R off , which shares the same set of eigenvalues. Note that matrix Ξ is not positive definite because it has all 0s on its diagonal. Since Ξ is a nonnegative matrix, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, we have |λ{Ξ}| ≤ λ max {Ξ}, where λ max {Ξ} is real and nonnegative. In other words, the maximum eigenvalue of Ξ indicates its spectral radius. By the Gergsgorin Disc Theorem, this eigenvalue can be bounded as follows.
That is, the maximum cost-to-benefit ratio,ρ, upper bounds the spectral radius of matrix Ξ. In particular, whenρ ≤ 1, i.e., λ max {Ξ} ≤ 1. It implies that the matrix I − Ξ is positive semidefinite, where I is the identity matrix. However, one cannot make a similar claim on Ξ − I whenρ ≥ 1, because Ξ can have negative eigenvalues.
F.1. Lower bound forρ ≤ 1
The bulk of the analysis to derive the constant lower bound is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, the first two steps are nearly identical as we express the Jacobian matrix R to be its diagonal and offdiagonal components Γ R and R off and follow through the steps shown in Section 3.2. We do need to modify the last step. Since I − Ξ is positive definite, the expression for the composite matrix could be simplified to
Since this matrix is nonnegative, it is copositive and we have obtained the desired result.
F.2. Lower bound forρ ≥ 1
From Lemma 4, we get Σq N ≥ Φq * . Note the vectors on both sides of the inequality are nonnegative. By Proposition 2, we obtain the following,
Replacing Σq N with Φq * , we obtain a lower bound on W (q N ), i.e., By making using of the Jacobian similarity properties on matrices Γ Note that by using the definition of the minimum eigenvalue of a positive semidefinite matrix, one way to bound 1/κ is shown as follows, ( 1 2
Combine the result with W (q * ), notice that it is all in the optimal q * space, therefore we will drop the superscript in this proof. DenoteB = B + 2Γ R , Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, a lower bound is given by the minimum eigenvalue of the following composite matrix,
The goal is to find an upper bound on λ max {((I − Ξ)(G + I + Ξ) −1 )) 2 }, which depends on the eigenvalues of G and Ξ. Since matrix G is a nonnegative and positive definite matrix, 
We have obtained an upper bound on λ max {Ξ} in Equation (17). To determine the minimum eigenvalue of G, we see that λ min {G} = λ min {Γ Meanwhile, since G is a positive definite matrix, λ min {G} > 0. We conclude that λ min {G} ≥ max(1 −γ, 0).
Substitute the bounds we have on λ min {G} and λ max {Ξ} into Equation (19), we have obtained the desired lower bound forρ > 1.
G. Proof for the upper bound in Theorem 2
The proof has three main steps and the two steps are identical to what have been shown in the proof for the upper bound in Theorem 1. We only need to modify the last step as follows. In Lemma 3, we have established an upper bound on the comparison of welfare achieved in the two settings in the terms of eigenvalues of a composite matrix, i.e., W (q N ) W (q * ) ≤ κ(1 − λ min {((I − Ξ)(G + I + Ξ) −1 )) 2 }).
Note matrix G is positive definite and the minimum eigenvalue of the composite matrix is bounded below Consider a function g(x, y) = ((x − 1)(x + y + 1))
2 with x ∈ [x,x]. Ifx ≤ 1, the function decreases in x. Thus, for a fixed y, the minimum of the function is achieved atx. Therefore, we obtain the following.
When λ max {Ξ} ≤ 1, To obtain the tightness result, note that with symmetric service providers, λ max {Ξ} =ρ and all the steps become equalities.
H. Proof for Proposition 5
With spillover cost, whenρ ≤ 1, it implies that q N ≤ q * and R N ≤ R * . Using the same argument in Lemma 4, an upper bound on κ is given by λ max {(Γ N R + R N ) −2 (Γ * R + R * ) 2 }. When service providers are symmetric with costs r ij = r for all i and j, R is a rank-1 matrix with two distinct eigenvalues, i.e., nr and 0. Then it is straightforward to show that the bound on κ reduces to (l (q * )/l (q N )) 2 . Thus, one can determine κ by substituting a lower bound on q N such as q N ≥ 1/2q * .
Another Jacobian similarity factor, κ , is defined in Equation ( boundq. One such example is to compute the output level when costs are zero, i.e.,q = (B + Γ B ) −1p , which is equivalent toq =p 2β i +(n−1)β j for the symmetric case.
